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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCHWARTZ, Senior District Judge 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Plaintiffs/appellants Gould Electronics, Inc. ("Gould") and 
American Premier Underwriters, Inc. ("APU") were co- 
defendants in a toxic tort case captioned Cheryl Allen, et al. 
v. Marathon Battery Co., et al., No. 1074/90 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) 
(the "Allen case"). The Allen case arose out of personal 
injuries and property damage allegedly caused by air and 
water pollution from a battery manufacturing plant in Cold 
Spring, New York. The plant was designed, constructed, 
owned, and operated by the United States Army, via its 
office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and owned and 
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operated by Gould and APU, and their predecessors, at 
various times. The Army was not a party to the Allen 
litigation. Gould and APU settled the Allen case for $4.5 
million. 
 
Gould and APU filed a Complaint against 
defendant/appellee United States of America ("United 
States"), in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking 
contribution and indemnity because of their entry into the 
Allen case settlement, pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims 
Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. SS 1346(b), 2671 et seq. The District 
Court granted the United States' Motion to Dismiss for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(1) ("Rule 12(b)(1)"), holding: (1) under Pennsylvania 
choice of law rules, New York contribution and indemnity 
law governs the FTCA jurisdictional inquiry; (2) the court 
lacks jurisdiction over the contribution claim because the 
United States would not be liable for contribution under 
N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law S 15-108(c), which bars settling 
parties from bringing contribution claims against non- 
settling parties (hereinafter "S 15-108(c)"); and (3) the court 
lacks jurisdiction over the indemnification claim because 
the United States would not be liable for indemnification 
under New York law, which bars indemnification when the 
plaintiff is at least partially at fault. 
 
Gould and APU contend the District Court erred by: (1) 
misapplying the standards governing a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(1); (2) holding New York, rather than 
Pennsylvania, contribution and indemnity law governs the 
jurisdictional inquiry, under Pennsylvania choice of law 
rules; (3) holding the United States would not be liable for 
contribution under S 15-108(c) because the United States 
waived the protection of S 15-108(c); and (4) holding the 
United States would not be liable for indemnity under New 
York law. 
 
We find the District Court properly applied the standards 
used for analyzing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, but 
erred in determining New York contribution and indemnity 
law controls the outcome. Rather we hold that Ohio law 
governs the jurisdictional inquiry and, under Ohio law, the 
United States would be liable for contribution, but not 
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indemnity.1 As such, the District Court has subject matter 
jurisdiction over Gould/APU's FTCA claim for contribution, 
but not for indemnity. The District Court's ruling is 
AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART and the case 
is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.2 
 
II. FACTS 
 
The plaintiffs/appellants are Gould, an Ohio corporation 
with its principal place of business in Ohio, and APU, a 
Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of 
business in Ohio (hereinafter "Gould/APU"). 
Defendant/appellee is the United States. 
 
In 1951, the Signal Corps of the United States Army 
("Army"), through its office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 
entered into a Letter Contract and Facilities Contract with 
Sonotone Corp. ("Sonotone"), a predecessor corporation to 
Gould. Pursuant to these contracts, the United States 
agreed to design and construct a battery manufacturing 
plant to be located on government property in Cold Spring, 
New York. Sonotone was to assist in the design of the plant 
and then operate the plant on a contract basis to produce 
batteries for the government. However, the United States 
retained ultimate supervision and control over the day-to- 
day operations of the plant. 
 
Between 1951 and 1952, the Army designed the plant, 
including its industrial waste water disposal and air 
emissions systems. For waste water disposal, Sonotone 
recommended a closed system to allow removal of 
hazardous material before releasing waste water from the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Because of our disposition it is unnecessary to reach the third and 
fourth points of error raised by Gould/APU. 
 
2. Gould/APU asserted jurisdiction of the District Court pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1346(b). This Court has jurisdiction over an appeal from a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. In this 
case, we use the word "jurisdiction" not in the usual subject matter 
context, but rather to refer to the extent of the sovereign immunity 
waiver in the Federal Tort Claims Act. As the Supreme Court explained 
in Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 201 (1993), "by its terms [28 
U.S.C. S 1346(b)] is more than a choice-of-law provision: It delineates 
the 
scope of the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity." 
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plant. The Army rejected the closed design, opting for an 
open system which did not remove hazardous material from 
the waste water. By January, 1953, the Army had caused 
the construction of the plant, including the waste water 
and air emission systems. 
 
From 1953 to 1962, Sonotone acted as contractor- 
operator of the plant, which produced nickel-cadmium 
batteries. During this time period, according to the 
Complaint, the Army owned and retained ultimate 
supervision and control over the plant, including: 
 
       (a) Title to all real and personal property remained 
       with the government; 
 
       (b) All equipment was to be installed by the 
       government; 
 
       (c) Title to all materials, supplies, work-in-process and 
       other property vested with the government; 
 
       (d) The Plant was to be used solely to fulfill 
       government contracts for an initial five year period; 
 
       (e) The government was to reimburse Sonotone for all 
       repairs, replacements and restorations "in excess 
       of normal requirements for maintenance and in 
       excess of fair wear and tear." Such reimbursed 
       expenditures were required to be pre-approved by 
       the government; 
 
       (f) The government was provided with access to the 
       Plant at all times; 
 
       (g) The Plant and facilities were to be erected, made 
       available, delivered and installed by the 
       government; 
 
       (h) The government reserved to itself the right to 
       dismantle, remove and ship the Plant and facilities 
       when deemed in the best interest of the 
       government to do so; and 
 
       (i) The government reserved to itself the right to 
       terminate use of the facility when the government 
       determined it was in its best interests to do so. 
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Complaint P 19. During this time, the plant discharged 
industrial waste water into Foundry Cove and the Hudson 
River and discharged contaminated dust and vapors into 
the air surrounding the plant. 
 
In 1962, the Army sold the plant to Sonotone. From 1962 
to 1969, Sonotone continued to operate the plant as a 
battery manufacturing plant and continued to discharge 
industrial waste water into Foundry Cove.3  In 1969, 
Sonotone sold the plant to Business Funds, Inc., which 
through a series of corporate mergers over the next several 
years, became Marathon Battery Co. and then plaintiff 
APU. From 1969 to 1979, APU owned and operated the 
plant, continued to produce batteries, and continued to 
discharge industrial waste water into Foundry Cove. 4 In 
1979, APU sold the plant to Merchandise Dynamics, Inc., 
which ceased manufacturing batteries at the plant. 
 
In 1990, residents of Cold Spring, New York filed the 
Allen lawsuit against, inter alia, Gould/APU in the Supreme 
Court of New York. The Allen plaintiffs alleged negligence 
and strict liability claims arising out of injuries caused by 
air and water pollution released from the plant. The United 
States was not named as a defendant and could not be 
joined as a co-defendant because of its sovereign immunity 
in state court. Gould/APU attempted to remove the case to 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York in order to join the United States as a defendant, 
but the request was denied. 
 
In 1991, the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency ("EPA") listed the plant and surrounding area (the 
"Site") on the National Priorities List for the Federal 
Superfund Program under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In 1967, Sonotone became a wholly owned subsidiary of Clevite 
Corporation and in 1969, Clevite merged with Gould. For simplicity, we 
use the name Sonotone to refer to the owner-operator of the plant from 
1962 to 1969. 
 
4. Between 1969 and 1979, Business Funds, Inc. became Marathon 
Battery Co. which eventually became APU. For simplicity, the name APU 
is used to refer to the relevant owner/operator of the plant from 1969 to 
1979. 
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("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. S 9601 et seq . In 1991, the EPA 
entered into a first consent decree ("First CERCLA Consent 
Decree") with Gould/APU and the Army providing for clean 
up of the Site. The First CERCLA Consent Decree contained 
a provision providing: 
 
       N. All Parties reserve all rights and legal obligations 
       with respect to any toxic tort claims including, but not 
       limited to, all claims asserted in Cheryl Allen, et al. v. 
       Marathon Battery Co., et al., Index No., 1074/90 (N.Y. 
       Sup. Ct.). 
 
Joint Appendix ("App.") 648a. 
 
In 1993, the EPA entered into a second consent decree 
("Second CERCLA Consent Decree") with Gould/APU and 
the Army covering the Site. The Second CERCLA Consent 
Decree contained, inter alia, two provisions providing: 
 
       5. Settling Parties specifically reserve and do not 
       hereby waive any defenses which they may have with 
       respect to any asserted liability related to the Site. 
       Settling Parties reserve all rights, defenses, and legal 
       contentions with respect to any third party claims, 
       including, but not limited to, all claims asserted in 
       Cheryl Allen et al. v. Marathon Battery Co., et al.  . . . . 
 
       . . . . 
 
       108. Settling Parties reserve, and this Consent Decree 
       is without prejudice to, (i) claims in the nature of 
       contribution among Settling Parties which may arise 
       from toxic tort claims, including those related to the 
       pending action in Cheryl Allen et al. v. Marathon 
       Battery Co., et al. . . . (iv) actions against the United 
       States based on negligent actions taken directly by the 
       United States . . . that are brought pursuant to any 
       statute other than CERCLA and for which the waiver of 
       sovereign immunity is found in a statute other than 
       CERCLA. 
 
App. 549a-550a, 628a-629a. 
 
In 1997, Gould/APU settled the Allen litigation for $4.5 
million. In 1998, Gould/APU filed administrative claims 
with the Army seeking contribution and indemnity for the 
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$4.5 million settlement. After these claims werefinally 
denied, Gould/APU filed this lawsuit against the United 
States. 
 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The standard of review is plenary where the District 
Court dismisses for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 
Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyds of London, 
106 F.3d 494, 496 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Standards for a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion 
 
Gould/APU contend the District Court erred in applying 
the standards for evaluating a Rule 12(b)(1) motion by: (1) 
considering evidence outside of the pleadings; (2) 
dismissing the case on an inadequate factual record; and 
(3) improperly treating the Rule 12(b)(1) motion as a Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)") motion, for failure to state 
a claim, and ruling on the merits of the case.5 We find the 
District Court did not err in any of these three respects. 
 
1. Considering Evidence Outside of the Pleadings 
 
Gould/APU argue "[b]ecause there were no affidavits, 
depositions, or testimony from which the district court 
could adduce facts outside of the Complaint, it should have 
accepted as true the facts set forth in the Complaint and 
not looked beyond them." Brief of Appellants at 7. A Rule 
12(b)(1) motion may be treated as either a facial or factual 
challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. See 
Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 
891 (3d Cir. 1977). In reviewing a facial attack, the court 
must only consider the allegations of the complaint and 
documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id. ; PBGC v. White, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Gould/APU also challenge the application of standards on a Rule 
12(b)(1) motion by arguing the Complaint alleges a claim for contribution 
and indemnity under the law of both New York and Pennsylvania. This 
argument relates to the substance of the District Court's conflict of laws 
analysis and is addressed in Section IV.B, infra. 
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998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).6 In reviewing a factual 
attack, the court may consider evidence outside the 
pleadings. See Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 176, 178- 
79 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891). 
 
Although not explicitly stated in its opinion, the District 
Court treated the United States' motion as a factual attack. 
In addition to the allegations in the Complaint and the 
documents referenced in the Complaint and attached 
thereto, the District Court considered the CERCLA Consent 
Decrees, which were not referenced in or attached to the 
Complaint. By treating the motion as a factual attack, the 
District Court properly considered evidence beyond the 
pleadings. 
 
2. Adequacy of Factual Record 
 
In a closely related argument Gould/APU contend the 
District Court erred by ruling on an inadequate factual 
record instead of allowing Gould/APU "to develop the 
record and introduce additional relevant facts supporting 
jurisdiction." Brief of Appellants at 8. In International Ass'n 
of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Northwest Airlines, 
Inc., this Court outlined procedures for ensuring that a 
ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) factual attack be based on an 
adequate factual record. See 673 F.2d 700, 711-12 (3d Cir. 
1982). If the defendant raises no challenge to the facts 
alleged in the pleadings, the court may rule on the motion 
by accepting the allegations as true. See id.  at 711. If the 
defendant contests any allegations in the pleadings, by 
presenting evidence, the court must permit the plaintiff to 
respond with evidence supporting jurisdiction. See id. at 
711-12. The court may then determine jurisdiction by 
weighing the evidence presented by the parties. See id. 
However, if there is a dispute of a material fact, the court 
must conduct a plenary trial on the contested facts prior to 
making a jurisdictional determination. See id.  at 712. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. PBGC held, in evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may 
consider documents attached to the complaint. See PBGC, 115 F.3d at 
178-79. We can think of no principled reason why a court, in resolving 
a Rule 12(b)(6) facial attack should not also consider documents 
attached to the complaint. 
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As to all issues, except for waiver of S 15-108(c), the 
United States did not challenge the truthfulness of any of 
the allegations in the Complaint or the attached 
documents. See App. 436a ("it appears that, based on 
Gould/APU's own allegations, their case is not within this 
Court's jurisdiction"); id. at n.1 ("This statement of facts . . . 
is taken entirely from the Gould/APU Complaint"). As to all 
issues, except for waiver of S 15-108(c), the District Court 
based its decision on accepting as true the allegations in 
the Complaint and the documents attached thereto. Since 
no facts were disputed, except waiver of S 15-108(c), the 
Court properly accepted as true all allegations of the 
Complaint and documents attached thereto and ruled on 
an adequate factual record. 
 
As to the waiver issue, Gould/APU asserted the Second 
CERCLA Consent Decree operated as a waiver, by the 
United States, of the bar against contribution claims under 
N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law S 15-108(c).7  Gould/APU attached to 
its answering brief filed in the District Court a copy of a 
portion of the Second CERCLA Consent Decree. In its reply 
brief, the United States attached a copy of both CERCLA 
Consent Decrees in their entirety. The District Court 
considered the CERCLA Consent Decrees in evaluating 
whether it had jurisdiction. 
 
The District Court properly considered the CERCLA 
Consent Decrees and did not need to take any additional 
evidence on the waiver issue. The allegations in the 
Complaint and attached documents did not relate to this 
issue. The CERCLA Consent Decree did not put into issue 
any of the allegations of the Complaint, but merely 
supplemented them. In addition, there was no dispute of 
any material fact in the CERCLA Consent Decrees. Rather, 
both parties agreed on the content of the CERCLA Consent 
Decrees, leaving the District Court to merely interpret the 
meaning of the relevant provisions. Finally, Gould/APU did 
not proffer any additional evidence relevant to this issue in 
the District Court. Accordingly, the Court evaluated the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Section 15-108(c) provides: "A tortfeasor who has obtained his own 
release from liability shall not be entitled to contribution from any 
other 
person." Id. 
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waiver issue based on an adequate factual record, 
consisting of the allegations in the Complaint, the 
documents attached thereto, and the CERCLA Consent 
Decrees. 
 
Finally, Gould/APU's request for additional discovery was 
properly denied as unnecessary and unwarranted because 
the United States did not contest the allegations in the 
Complaint. Moreover, while Gould/APU have argued to this 
Court that they be allowed to supplement the factual 
record, they failed to do so before the District Court, 
thereby waving the issue at the appellate level. 
 
3. Treating a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion as a Rule 12(b)(6) 
       Motion 
 
Gould/APU contend the District Court improperly treated 
the Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim by improperly considering the merits 
of the case instead of assessing the court's jurisdiction. 
This Court has previously cautioned against treating a Rule 
12(b)(1) motion as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and reaching the 
merits of the claims. See Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, 
Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991). This concern 
arises because the standard for surviving a Rule 12(b)(1) 
motion is lower than that for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See id. 
 
In a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court evaluates the merits 
of the claims by accepting all allegations in the complaint 
as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiffs, and determining whether they state a claim as a 
matter of law. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities 
Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1420 (3d Cir. 1996). The 
defendant bears the burden of showing no claim has been 
stated. See Kehr Packages, 926 F.2d at 1409. In contrast, 
in a factual attack under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may 
consider and weigh evidence outside the pleadings to 
determine if it has jurisdiction. See Mortensen , 549 F.2d at 
891. The plaintiff has the burden of persuasion to convince 
the court it has jurisdiction. See Kehr Packages , 926 F.2d 
at 1409. A claim may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) only 
if it "clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for 
the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction" or is"wholly 
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insubstantial and frivolous." Id. (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 
This claim under the FTCA is somewhat unique because 
the merits of the case are closely intertwined with the 
jurisdictional proof -- both are determined by evaluating 
whether the United States would be liable "in accordance 
with the law of the place where the act or omission 
occurred." 28 U.S.C. S 1346(b)(1). However, when the merits 
and jurisdiction are closely related, a court may determine 
subject matter jurisdiction without reaching the merits, so 
long as the court "demand[s] less in the way of 
jurisdictional proof than would be appropriate at a trial 
stage." Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891 (permitting evaluation of 
jurisdiction for claim under Sherman Act where merits and 
jurisdiction closely intertwined); see also Gotha, 115 F.3d at 
178-79. 
 
In Gotha, the defendant asserted the court lacked 
jurisdiction under the FTCA because the claim fell under 
the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. See 
Gotha, 115 F.3d at 178-79. This case involves a 
determination of jurisdiction under the FTCA based on 
whether the United States would be liable "in accordance 
with the law of the place where the act or omission 
occurred." 28 U.S.C. S 1346(b)(1). Although a different 
provision of the FTCA is implicated, we see no principled 
reason to distinguish between a jurisdictional 
determination based on the discretionary function 
exception and one based on a conflict of law analysis. 
Indeed, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has allowed 
jurisdictional determinations, apart from merits 
consideration, based upon S 1346(b)(1). See Marakova v. 
United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). Adhering 
to our precedent, a court may determine subject matter 
jurisdiction over an FTCA claim, involving a conflict of laws 
analysis, so long as it demands less in the way of 
jurisdictional proof than it would for a ruling on the merits. 
 
The District Court did just that. First, it rehearsed the 
standards for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion and performed its 
analysis under these standards.8 Next, the District Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In contrast, in Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, Pa., this 
Court reversed the District Court's purported dismissal under Rule 
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performed a conflict of laws analysis under the FTCA by 
weighing the evidence before it, accepting as true all 
allegations in the Complaint, the documentary evidence 
attached thereto, and the CERCLA Consent Decrees. 
Finally, the District Court did not demand an inordinate 
amount of jurisdictional proof. Having done precisely what 
is required, the District Court did not err by implicitly 
treating the Rule 12(b)(1) motion as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 
 
B. Conflict of Laws 
 
The FTCA waives sovereign immunity and grants district 
courts jurisdiction over tort claims against the United 
States "under circumstances where the United States, if a 
private person, would be liable to the claimant in 
accordance with the law of the place where the act or 
omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. S 1346(b)(1) (emphasis 
added). In order to determine whether it has jurisdiction, 
the court must evaluate whether the United States would 
be liable under the "whole law" of the state in which the act 
or omission occurred. See Richards v. United States, 369 
U.S. 1, 11 (1962); Small v. United States, 333 F.2d 702, 704 
(3d Cir. 1964). When a case involves multiple alleged acts 
or omissions occurring in more than one state, the FTCA, 
as construed by Richards, requires the District Court to 
engage in a complex conflict of laws analysis to determine 
which state law governs the jurisdictional inquiry. The 
Complaint alleges acts or omissions occurring in New York 
and Pennsylvania.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12(b)(1) as being, in essence, a 12(b)(6) dismissal, in part, because the 
District Court failed to mention or apply the standards for a Rule 
12(b)(1) 
motion. See 983 F.2d 1277, 1281 (3d Cir. 1993). 
9. The Complaint alleges the United States committed the following acts 
or omissions in New York: ownership of the property where the plant was 
located; construction of the plant; ownership of the plant; and 
installation of equipment in the plant. In addition, whether or not 
performed by the United States, the following acts or omissions allegedly 
occurred in New York: operation of the plant; discharge of hazardous 
waste into the water and air; and personal injuries and property damage 
to the Allen plaintiffs. Finally, the underlying Allen case was filed in 
New 
York and settled in New York. 
 
The Complaint alleges the United States committed the following acts 
or omissions in Pennsylvania: entering into Letter Contract and Facilities 
Contract with Sonotone to allow Sonotone to operate the plant; entering 
into lease agreements with Sonotone; and selling the plant to Sonotone. 
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The District Court determined that most of the acts or 
omissions occurred in New York, but it noted that even if 
some occurred in Pennsylvania, its choice of law rules 
would indicate that New York had the more significant 
interest in the outcome of the litigation and, therefore, New 
York contribution and indemnity law should govern the 
jurisdictional inquiry. See id. at 4-5. Gould/APU contend 
the District Court erred in determining New York, and not 
Pennsylvania, contribution and indemnification law governs 
the jurisdictional inquiry, under Pennsylvania choice of law.10 
Thus, in the District Court and as originally briefed before 
this Court, the litigants differed over application of 
Pennsylvania choice of law rules, rather than addressing 
which state's choice of law governs.11  
 
Because Richards interpreted the "law of the place where 
the act or omission occurred" to mean the "whole law" of 
the state where the act or omission occurred, including that 
state's choice of law rules, a two step choice of law analysis 
is required when multiple acts or omissions have occurred 
in more than one state. First, the court must select between 
the states' respective choice of law rules. See Richards, 369 
U.S. at 11; Ducey v. United States, 713 F.2d 504, 509 n.2 
(9th Cir. 1983); Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311, 
1318 (7th Cir. 1978); James A. Shapiro, Choice of Law 
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act: Richards and Renvoi 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Gould/APU also argue the District Court erred in conducting any 
choice of law analysis. Gould/APU contend, because contribution and 
indemnification law is procedural, not substantive, the District Court 
was bound to choose the contribution and indemnification law for the 
state in which it sits, Pennsylvania. We disagree. While there is a 
procedure/substance distinction for a conflict of laws analysis when, as 
here, the District Court determines jurisdiction pursuant to the FTCA. 
The FTCA requires application of the relevant state's "whole law," 
without making a distinction between procedure and substance. See 28 
U.S.C. S 1346(b)(1); Richards, 369 U.S. at 11. 
 
11. Prior to oral argument, the litigants were requested to file 
supplemental briefs addressing, inter alia, the following question: 
 
       Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, how should a court choose 
       between conflicting choice of law provisions when the acts or 
       omissions occurred in more than one state? See Richards v. United 
       States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962). 
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Revisited, 70 N.C.L.Rev. 641, 669-75 (1992). Second, the 
court must apply that state's choice of law rules to 
determine which state's substantive tort law applies. See 
Richards, 369 U.S. at 11; Tyminski v. United States, 481 
F.2d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 1973). Because of this bifurcated 
analysis, the state whose choice of law rules are selected in 
the first step may or may not be the same state whose 
substantive law is chosen in the second step. 
 
Before proceeding to the conflict of laws analysis, it is 
prudent to ensure that there is not a "false conflict" in the 
underlying choice of law rules or the underlying 
contribution and indemnity law making it unnecessary to 
engage in this complex bifurcated analysis. See Williams v. 
Stone, 109 F.3d 890, 893 (3rd Cir. 1997). In thefirst step, 
Pennsylvania and New York, the two possible jurisdictions 
where acts or omissions occurred, differ in their choice of 
law rules. Pennsylvania employs an interest analysis,12 
while New York uses so-called Neumeier rules which focus 
on the parties' domiciles.13 In the second step, four possible 
jurisdictions' substantive law may apply: New York (where 
acts or omissions occurred), Pennsylvania (where acts or 
omissions occurred), Ohio (domicile of Gould and APU), and 
the District of Columbia (possible domicile of the United 
States). As to the contribution claim, there is a conflict 
between New York law on one hand and Pennsylvania, 
Ohio, and District of Columbia law on the other hand, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. See Laconis v. Burlington County Bridge Comm'n, 583 A.2d 1218, 
1222 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). In an interest analysis, the court determines 
which jurisdiction is most intimately concerned with the outcome of the 
action, considering four factors: 
 
       (1) the place where the injury occurred; (2) the place where the 
       conduct causing the injury occurred; (3) the domicile, residence, 
       nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the 
       parties; and (4) the place where the relationship between the 
parties 
       is centered. 
 
Id. at 1222-23. 
 
13. See Padula v. Lilarn Properties, Corp. , 84 N.Y.2d 519, 521-22 (N.Y. 
1994); Cooney v. Osgood Mach., 612 N.E.2d 277, 280 (N.Y. 1993); 
Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457-58 (N.Y. 1972); see also, 
infra, Section IV.B.2. 
 
                                15 
  
which necessitates a conflict of laws analysis. Compare N.Y. 
Gen. Oblig. Law S 15-108(c)14 (barring contribution claims 
by settling tortfeasors against non-settling joint tortfeasors) 
with 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 8324; 15 Swartz v. 
Sunderland, 169 A.2d 289, 291 (Pa. 1961) (allowing 
contribution claims by settling tortfeasors against non- 
settling tortfeasors); Ohio Stat. S 2307.31; 16 Metrohealth 
Medical Center v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 685 N.E.2d 529, 
532 (Ohio 1997) (same); District of Columbia v. Washington 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. See, supra, note 7. 
 
15. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 8324 provides: 
 
       (a) General rule.--The right of contribution exists among joint 
tort- 
       feasors. 
 
       (b) Payment required.--A joint tort-feasor is not entitled to a 
money 
       judgment for contribution until he has by payment discharged the 
       common liability or has paid more than his pro rata share thereof. 
 
       (c) Effect of settlement.--A joint tort-feasor who enters into a 
       settlement with the injured person is not entitled to recover 
       contribution from another joint tort-feasor whose liability to the 
       injured person is not extinguished by the settlement. 
 
16. Ohio Stat. S 2307.31 provides, in pertinent part: 
 
       (A) Except as otherwise provided in this section or section 2307.32 
       of the Revised Code, if two or more persons are jointly and 
severally 
       liable in tort for the same injury or loss to person or property or 
for 
       the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among 
       them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or 
       any of them. The right of contribution exists only in favor of a 
       tortfeasor who has paid more than his proportionate share of the 
       common liability, and his total recovery is limited to the amount 
       paid by him in excess of his proportionate share. No tortfeasor is 
       compelled to make contribution beyond that tortfeasor's own 
       proportionate share of the common liability. There is no right of 
       contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who intentionally has 
caused 
       or intentionally has contributed to the injury or loss to person or 
       property or the wrongful death. 
 
       (B) A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is 
not 
       entitled [sic] recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose 
       liability for the injury or loss to person or property or the 
wrongful 
       death is not extinguished by the settlement, or in respect to any 
       amount paid in a settlement which is in excess of what is 
       reasonable. 
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Hosp. Ctr., 722 A.2d 332, 342 & n. 12-14 (D.C. 1998) (and 
cases cited therein) (although leaving question unresolved, 
would likely allow contribution claims by settling 
tortfeasors against non-settling tortfeasors). However, there 
is no conflict between the indemnification law of New York, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and the District of Columbia. Each 
bars indemnification where the party seeking 
indemnification is partially at fault. See Rosado v. Proctor & 
Schwartz, Inc., 484 N.E.2d 1354, 1356-57 (N.Y. 1985); 
Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 77 A.2d 368, 371 (Pa. 
1951); Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Huron Road Hospital, 653 
N.E.2d 235, 238 (Ohio 1995); Quadrangle Development 
Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 748 A.2d 432, 435 (D.C. 2000). 
Accordingly, we conduct the conflict of laws analysis to 
determine only which state's contribution law governs. 
 
1. Step 1: Selection of Choice of Law Under FTCA 
       Where Acts or Omissions Occurred in More Than 
       One State 
 
Because multiple acts or omissions are alleged to have 
occurred in New York and Pennsylvania, the Court must 
elect between Pennsylvania and New York choice of law 
rules. The FTCA, as interpreted by Richards, requires the 
Court to select the choice of law rules of the state where the 
"acts or omissions" occurred, not where the injury 
occurred. See 28 U.S.C. S 1346(b)(1) (United States liable 
for "injury or loss of property . . . in accordance with the 
law of the place where the act or omission occurred") 
(emphasis added); Richards, 369 U.S. at 11-13. Neither the 
text of the FTCA nor Richards provides any guidance on 
how to choose between conflicting choice of law rules when 
the alleged acts or omissions occur in more than one state. 
Moreover, the legislative history of the FTCA sheds no light 
on this problem. The selection of what choice of law rules 
to apply at the first step of the analysis has been largely 
undeveloped. However, where courts have spoken, they 
have adopted five approaches. 
 
In the first approach, when the injury can be parsed by 
the acts or omissions in the different states, one court 
applied the choice of law rules on an act-by-act basis, 
applying the relevant state's choice of law rules for each act 
or omission. See United States v. Kohn, 591 F.Supp. 568, 
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572 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). In Kohn, the plaintiffs sued the United 
States Army for emotional distress caused by acts or 
omissions occurring in Kentucky and New York, relating to 
the treatment of a family member's corpse. See id. at 571. 
In Kentucky, plaintiffs alleged the Army performed an 
unauthorized autopsy, failed to return organs to the body 
for burial, embalmed the body, and cremated missing 
organs. See id. In New York, plaintiffs alleged the Army 
communicated inaccurate and misleading information 
about the circumstances of the death, and failed to provide 
an honor guard at the burial. See id. Because each act by 
the Army was a distinct tort that, absent the others, could 
have caused an emotional distress injury, the Court applied 
Kentucky choice of law to the acts in Kentucky and New 
York choice of law to the acts in New York. See id. at 572. 
The Kohn approach is unworkable in this case because the 
Allen plaintiffs' injuries are indivisible and cannot be parsed 
based on the alleged acts by the United States. 
 
A second and a third approach were outlined in Bowen, 
supra, which held the court should elect the choice of law 
rules of "the place of the last act or omission having a 
causal effect" or "the place of the act or omission having the 
most significant causal effect." Bowen, 570 F.2d at 1318.17 
In Bowen, an airplane en route from Arkansas to Indiana 
crashed in Indiana because of ice on its wings. See id. at 
1314. The plaintiff sued the Federal Aviation Administration 
for failure to advise the pilot of icy conditions at various 
points along the route in Arkansas, Illinois, and Indiana. 
See id. While expressing a preference for the latter "most 
significant causal effect approach," the court declined to 
decide which approach to take because both the last act 
having causal effect and the act with the most significant 
causal effect occurred in Indiana, where the plane crashed. 
See id. at 1318 & n.14. Accordingly, the court applied 
Indiana choice of law rules. See id. at 1318. 
 
In this case, either of the two Bowen criteria result in the 
selection of New York choice of law rules. Under thefirst 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. In Andrulonis v. United States, the Court utilized that latter Bowen 
approach. See 724 F.Supp. 1421, 1471 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing Bowen, 
570 F.2d at 1318). 
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Bowen approach, the last act or omission which caused the 
Allen plaintiffs' injuries was the operation of the plant 
resulting in discharge of hazardous waste into the water 
and air. It is undisputed that the operation and discharge 
occurred in New York.18 It follows, under the first Bowen 
approach, the Court should apply New York choice of law 
rules. 
 
Under the second Bowen approach, the acts or omissions 
having the most significant causal effect on the Allen 
plaintiffs' injuries were either constructing the plant or 
operating the plant to discharge hazardous waste into the 
water and air. According to the undisputed allegations in 
the Complaint, the United States constructed the plant in 
New York. Also, the United States operated the plant 
causing the discharge of hazardous waste, in New York. 
See, supra, note 18 and accompanying text. Since both of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Although the United States contracted with Sonotone for operation of 
the plant, it is still deemed to have been operating the plant by virtue 
of 
the control it retained over the operations. Cf. FMC Corp. v. United 
States 
Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 843 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc). In FMC, 
a CERCLA case, this Court determined the United States was an 
operator of a plant even if it contracted out the operation, so long as it 
retained substantial control over the facility and has active involvement 
in the activities there. See id. In FMC , the United States was held to be 
an operator of a plant because it: 
 
       determined what product the facility would manufacture, controlled 
       the supply and price of the facility's raw materials, in part by 
       building or causing plants to be built near the facility for their 
       production, supplied equipment for use in the manufacturing 
       process, acted to ensure that the facility retained an adequate 
labor 
       force, participated in the management and supervision of the labor 
       force, had the authority to remove workers who were incompetent or 
       guilty of misconduct, controlled the price of the facility's 
product, 
       and controlled who could purchase the product. 
 
Id. Similarly, the United States was an operator of the Cold Spring 
battery plant because it owned all real and personal property, installed 
all equipment, owned all materials and supplies, controlled what the 
plant would produce, had access to the plant at all times, reserved the 
right to dismantle or repair the plant, reserved the right to shut down 
the plant, and had the ability to exercise day-to-day control over the 
operations of the plant, and, through contracts, set the price terms for 
products produced by the plant. 
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the "most significant" acts occurred in New York, under this 
approach, it is appropriate to apply New York choice of law 
rules. 
 
Under a fourth approach, the court selects the choice of 
law rules of the state in which "physical acts" could have 
prevented the injury. See Ducey, 713 F.2d at 509 n.2. In 
Ducey, plaintiffs brought an FTCA claim alleging injuries 
arising from the United States' failure to place warning 
signs and erect fences at a park in Nevada, stemming in 
part from decisions made at a government office in 
California. See id. The Court elected Nevada choice of law 
rules because the injury could have been prevented by 
physical acts in Nevada. See id. Likewise, the Allen 
plaintiffs' injuries were caused by the discharge of 
hazardous waste at a plant in New York, which the United 
States owned, constructed, and controlled its operation,19 
stemming from decisions made at a government office in 
Pennsylvania. Under this approach, application of New York 
choice of law rules is appropriate because New York is 
where physical acts could have prevented the injuries. 
 
A fifth approach was taken by the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which made a choice of choice of 
law based on where the "relevant" act or omission occurred. 
See Hitchcock v. United States, 665 F.2d 354, 359 (D.C. Cir. 
1981). In Hitchcock, the plaintiff was injured by a vaccine 
administered by a government nurse in Virginia, but where 
the protocol for its use was developed by government 
officials in the District of Columbia. See id.  The Court 
applied District of Columbia choice of law because, 
although the vaccine was administered in Virginia, no 
relevant act occurred in Virginia. The nurse was the only 
staff member at the Virginia facility and was given no 
instructions about the protocol for administering the 
vaccine or the risks from administration. See id. According 
to Hitchcock, the only relevant negligent acts and omissions 
were the development of the protocol for administration 
performed by officials in the District of Columbia. See id. In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. As discussed in note 18, supra, the United States is deemed to have 
operated the plant in New York by virtue of the control it exercised over 
the plant's operations. 
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contrast, in this case, the relevant acts of ownership, 
construction, and control over operation of the plant were 
performed by the United States Army in New York. Under 
this approach, it is appropriate to select the choice of law 
rules of New York. 
 
In conclusion, there are five approaches to the election of 
choice of law. The Kohn approach is unworkable. However, 
the Court need not decide whether to adopt the second, 
third, fourth, or fifth approach because each leads to 
application of New York choice of law rules. Under these 
approaches, the last causal act, the most significant causal 
act, physical acts to prevent injury, and the relevant acts 
all occurred in New York. It follows, the District Court 
should have applied New York choice of law rules. 
 
2. Step 2: Application of New York Choice of Law 
       Rules 
 
New York choice of law rules differ depending on whether 
the underlying substantive law is conduct regulating or loss 
allocating. See Padula v. Lilarn Properties Corp., 84 N.Y.2d 
519, 521-22 (N.Y. 1994). Conduct regulating law has"the 
prophylactic effect of governing conduct to prevent injuries 
from occurring." Id. at 522. Loss allocating law "prohibit[s], 
assign[s], or limit[s] liability after the tort occurs." Id. 
Contribution law is loss allocating because it assigns or 
limits liability after the tort occurs. See id.  (citing Cooney v. 
Osgood Mach., 612 N.E.2d 277, 280 (N.Y. 1993)); Ray v. 
Knights, 605 N.Y.S.2d 536, 538 (N.Y.App. 1993). 20 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. The United States asserts that loss allocating law relates only to the 
parties' expectations before torts are committed. It argues the S 15-
108(c) 
bar against contribution claims is not loss allocating because it does not 
relate to prior expectations of tort liability. Rather, the United States 
contends S 15-108(c) is "a mechanism to influence and control the 
conduct of litigation in its jurisdiction." United States Letter Brief 
(June 
9, 2000) at 4. 
 
This argument fails. In New York, like most jurisdictions, contribution 
claims were generally not recognized at common law. See Gleason v. 
Holman Contract Warehousing, Inc., 649 N.Y.S.2d 647, 649-50 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1996). Rather, New York, like most states, enacted a statute 
providing for contribution among joint tortfeasors. Section 15-108 is a 
portion of New York's contribution statute. See  S 15-108. Since New York 
courts have held contribution law to be loss allocating, see Padula, 84 
N.Y.2d at 522, section 15-108(c) must be loss allocating. 
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Under New York choice of law, there are three rules for 
choosing between loss allocating law, all keyed to the 
domicile of the litigants. See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 
N.E.2d 454, 457-58 (N.Y. 1972); Cooney, 612 N.E.2d at 
281. First, when the plaintiff and defendant share a 
common domicile, the law of that state controls. Second, 
when the plaintiff and defendant are not domiciled in the 
same state (a "split domicile"), the states have conflicting 
law, and the tort occurs in one of the domiciles, the law of 
the state where the tort occurred controls. Third, in all 
other situations where there is a split domicile, the law of 
the state where the tort occurred controls, unless"it can be 
shown that displacing that normally applicable rule will 
advance the relevant substantive law purposes without 
impairing the smooth working of the multistate system or 
producing great uncertainty for litigants." Neumeier, 286 
N.E.2d at 458. Originally developed for guest statutes, 
these three Neumeier rules have been extended to choice of 
law for all loss allocating law. See Cooney, 612 N.E.2d at 
281; Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 
684 (N.Y. 1985). 
 
The New York choice of law analysis is performed in two 
steps. First, in order to choose the correct Neumeier rule, 
we determine the domicile of the parties. Second, based on 
the domiciles of the parties, we choose and apply the 
appropriate Neumeier rule. 
 
       a. Domicile of the Parties 
 
For purposes of New York choice of law, a corporation is 
domiciled where it has its principal place of business.21 See 
Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 682; Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. 
v. Garrett Corp., 625 F.Supp. 752, 754, 760 & n.11 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re DES Cases, 789 F.Supp. 552, 590 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. In general, for purposes of other areas of New York law, the domicile 
of a corporation is the state in which it is incorporated. See Sease v. 
Central Greyhound Lines, Inc., 117 N.E.2d 899 (N.Y. 1954); Comer v. 
Titan Tool, Inc., 875 F.Supp. 255, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). A person, 
including a corporation, can have a different domicile for purposes of 
applying different laws. See Gladwin v. Power , 249 N.Y.S.2d 980, 982 
(N.Y.App. 1964). 
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(E.D.N.Y. 1992). Gould, an Ohio corporation with its 
principal place of business in Ohio, is domiciled in Ohio. 
APU, a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of 
business in Ohio, is also domiciled in Ohio. 
 
There are three possibilities for the domicile of the United 
States, for purposes of New York choice of law. First, the 
parties and the District Court assumed the United States is 
domiciled in all 50 states. See United States v. Whitcomb, 
314 F.2d 415 (4th Cir. 1963) (under Maryland law, United 
States domiciled in all states) (citing Helvering v. 
Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 91-93 (1934); 
Vaughn v. Northup, 40 U.S. 1, 6 (1841)), but see Ward 
Electronic Services, Inc. v. Property & Cas. Ins. Guar. Corp., 
599 A.2d 81, 84 (Md. 1991) (the United States is not 
domiciled in all 50 states under Maryland law). However, 
neither Helvering nor Vaughn supports the United States 
being domiciled in all 50 states. See Helvering , 293 U.S. at 
91-93 (holding United States has residence, not domicile, in 
all states); Vaughn, 40 U.S. at 6 ("[t]he United States, in 
their sovereign capacity, have no particular place of 
domicile, but possess, in contemplation of law, an ubiquity 
throughout the Union . . . .") (emphasis added). Finally, and 
most importantly, for present purposes, the United States 
being domiciled in all 50 states runs counter to New York's 
rule that a person may have only one state of domicile. See 
In re Strobel's Estate, 109 N.Y.S.2d 848, 850 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 
1951); 49 N.Y.Jur.2d, Domicile & Residence S 1 (1985). 
Therefore, under New York choice of law, it is unlikely the 
United States would be considered domiciled in all 50 
states. 
 
The second possibility is the United States is domiciled 
nowhere. See Vaughn, 40 U.S. at 6 ("[t]he United States, in 
their sovereign capacity, have no particular place of domicile 
. . . .") (emphasis added); O'Rourke v. Eastern Airlines, 730 
F.2d 842, 851 n.12 (2d Cir. 1984) (without citation, under 
New York choice of law, "[t]he United States, of course, is 
neither incorporated nor domiciled in any one state"); 
Foster v. U.S., 768 F.2d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(without citation, under Florida choice of law,"the United 
States is obviously a domiciliary of neither [Florida nor 
Illinois]"); Clawans v. U.S., 75 F.Supp.2d 368, 373-74 
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(D.N.J. 1999) (without citation, under New Jersey choice of 
law, the United States is not domiciled in New Jersey). 
However, this position is not as iron clad as itfirst appears. 
Each of the cited cases lack citation to authority. See id. 
Also, none of these cases is from a New York state court 
determining the domicile of the United States under New 
York choice of law. See id. Indeed, O'Rourke, Clawans, and 
Foster merely state the United States is not domiciled in the 
state under discussion without mention of where the 
United States is domiciled. See O'Rourke, 730 F.2d at 851 
n.12; Foster, 768 F.2d at 1284; Clawans , 75 F.Supp.2d at 
373-74. Nonetheless, it is possible the United States is not 
domiciled in any state. 
 
The third possibility is the United States is domiciled in 
the District of Columbia. See Fisher v. Fisher , 165 N.E.2d 
460, 462 (N.Y. 1918); Hitchcock v. United States , 665 F.2d 
354, 360 (D.C.Cir. 1981) (without citation, under District of 
Columbia choice of law, "[i]t is thus useful to analogize the 
Government in this case to a corporation of national scope, 
headquartered in Washington"). In Fisher, the highest court 
of New York applied New York choice of law and determined 
the United States is domiciled in the District of Columbia. 
See Fisher, 165 N.E.2d at 463.22 The Fisher position runs 
counter to Vaughn and O'Rourke, discussed supra. Also, 
the Fisher decision is quite old and predates modern New 
York choice of law rules. Nonetheless, because Fisher is the 
only decision from a New York court applying New York 
choice of law to the question of domicile of the United 
States, it is possible a New York state court would consider 
the United States to be domiciled in the District of 
Columbia. 
 
In conclusion, there is some authority supporting the 
mutually exclusive positions of the United States being 
domiciled in all 50 states, in the District of Columbia, or 
nowhere. We need not select among these positions 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. The Court needed to determine the domicile of the United States as 
an owner of a ship. See id. at 462. The Court first determined the United 
States is not domiciled in New York. See id. Next, the Court found the 
agency that owned the ship was domiciled in the District of Columbia, 
making the United States domiciled there. See id. at 463. 
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because the result under New York choice of law rules will 
be the same. 
 
       b. Application of Neumeier Rules 
 
       (1) Assuming United States Domiciled in All 50 
       States 
 
If the United States is domiciled in all 50 states, the first 
Neumeier rule applies.23See Neumeier, 286 N.E.2d at 458 
(when parties share common domicile, the law of that state 
controls). Assuming the United States is domiciled in all 50 
states, the United States, Gould, and APU share the 
common domicile of Ohio and Ohio contribution law would 
govern. 
 
       (2) Assuming United States Domiciled in the 
       District of Columbia or Nowhere 
 
If the United States is domiciled in the District of 
Columbia or nowhere, there is a "split-domicile" between 
Gould/APU and the United States, requiring application of 
the second or third Neumeier rules. Under the second rule, 
when the plaintiff and defendant are not domiciled in the 
same state, the states have conflicting law, and the tort 
occurs in one of the domiciles, the law of the state where 
the tort occurred controls. See Neumeier, 286 N.E.2d at 
458. The locus of the tort is the state where "the last event 
necessary to make the actor liable" occurred. Schultz, 480 
N.E.2d at 682-83. In Schultz, plaintiffs' children, New 
Jersey residents, were sexually abused by defendants at a 
camp in New York. See id. at 681. The Court held the locus 
of the tort was New York, the place where the injuries 
occurred. See id. at 683. In this case, the last event which 
caused injuries to the Allen plaintiffs was the release of 
hazardous waste from the plant in New York, making New 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. The United States argues, if the United States is domiciled in all 50 
states, the second Neumeier rule applies because Gould/APU are 
domiciled in Ohio and the United States is domiciled in New York, 
creating a split-domicile situation. However, thefirst Neumeier rule 
applies whenever the parties "share a common domicile." Cooney, 612 
N.E.2d at 281. 
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York the locus of the tort, for purposes of the Neumeier 
rules. Regardless of whether the United States is domiciled 
in the District of Columbia or nowhere, the locus of the tort 
was not one of the parties' domiciles. Therefore, the second 
Neumeier rule does not apply. 
 
The third Neumeier rule provides that in all other 
situations with a split domicile, the law of the locus of the 
tort governs, unless "it can be shown that displacing that 
normally applicable rule will advance the relevant 
substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth 
working of the multistate system or producing great 
uncertainty for litigants." Neumeier, 286 N.E.2d at 458. 
Regardless of whether the United States is domiciled 
nowhere or in the District of Columbia, New York 
contribution law governs unless there is an exception 
allowing displacement of New York law ("locus law") with 
Ohio law, the law of the plaintiff 's domicile ("domiciliary 
law"). It is appropriate to displace the locus law with 
domiciliary law when the plaintiff 's domicile has a strong 
interest in protecting the rights of its domiciliary and 
displacement will not interfere with the interests of the 
locus state. See Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 687. 
 
The purpose of this exception is to achieve New York's 
strong preference for using domiciliary law as the loss 
allocating law. See Comer v. Titan Tool Inc., 875 F.Supp. 
255, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek , 47 
F.Supp.2d 330, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). In Comer, the Court 
explained: 
 
       When the law in conflict is loss allocating, the law of 
       the state where at least one of the parties is domiciled 
       generally applies. See Padula v. Lilarn Properties Corp., 
       84 N.Y.2d 519, 620 N.Y.S.2d 310, 311-12, 644 N.E.2d 
       1001, 1002-03 (1994); Schultz, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 94, 480 
       N.E.2d at 683; Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 
       335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 286 N.E.2d 454 (1972). . . . 
 
       A state has a strong interest in enforcing its own loss- 
       allocating rules, see Schultz, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 96, 480 
       N.E.2d at 685, especially in cases where such rules 
       would serve to protect one of its own domiciliaries who 
       was injured outside of the state. See id., Neumeier, 31 
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       N.Y.2d 121, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 67, 286 N.E.2d 454, 455- 
       56. In cases in which none of the parties share 
       domicile (so-called "split-domicile" cases) the law of the 
       domicile of at least one of the parties ought to apply. 
       Neumeier, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 67, 286 
       N.E.2d 454, 455-56. . . . 
 
Comer, 875 F.Supp. at 259 (emphasis added). 
 
Courts have been more willing to displace locus law with 
domiciliary law when one or more of the following factors 
are present: (1) the plaintiff 's and defendant's domiciliary 
law is similar, see Tkaczevski v. Ryder Truck Rental Inc., 22 
F.Supp.2d 169, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); (2) the purpose of the 
domiciliary law is superior to and does not interfere with 
the purpose of the locus law, see Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 
687; (3) the locus of the tort is not one of the plaintiff 's or 
defendant's domiciles, see, e.g., id.; (4) plaintiff 's and 
defendant's contacts with the locus state were a matter of 
fortuity, happenstance, or randomness, and not voluntary 
action, see, e.g., Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 47 F.Supp.2d 330, 
341 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); (5) displacement will not encourage 
forum shopping, see, e.g., Aboud v. Budget Rent a Car 
Corp., 29 F.Supp.2d 178, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); and (6) 
displacement will not create the appearance of favoring 
local litigants, see id. An evaluation of these factors, in light 
of the purpose of the exception, dictates that New York 
contribution law should be displaced with Ohio 
contribution law. 
 
        (a) Similarity of Domiciles' Laws 
 
First, courts are more likely to displace the locus law 
with domiciliary law when the domiciliary law of the 
plaintiff and defendant is similar. See Tkaczevski, 22 
F.Supp.2d at 173. Three reasons have been articulated in 
support of this principle: (i) New York choice of law prefers 
domiciliary law to apply in loss allocating situations; (ii) 
neither party can complain about upset expectations when 
its own domiciliary law, or the equivalent, is applied; and 
(iii) the locus of the tort is only to be used as a tie breaker. 
See id. Further, there should be no difference in result 
where the plaintiff and defendant have the same domicile 
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(where the first Neumeier rule governs and the law of the 
common domicile applies), and the plaintiff and defendant 
have a split domicile but with the same domiciliary law 
(where the third Neumeier rule governs). 
 
Ohio contribution law permits contribution claims by 
settling tortfeasors against non-settling joint tortfeasors. 
See Ohio Stat. S 2307.31; Metrohealth , 80 Ohio St.3d at 
214, 685 N.E.2d at 532. If the United States is considered 
to be domiciled nowhere, then it has no domiciliary law to 
compare to Ohio contribution law. However, since 
Gould/APU's domiciliary law and the United States lack of 
domiciliary law are not in conflict, this factor weighs 
towards displacing New York law with Ohio law. 
 
If the United States is considered to be domiciled in the 
District of Columbia, the District of Columbia will most 
likely permit contribution claims by settling tortfeasors 
against non-settling joint tortfeasors. See District of 
Columbia v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 722 A.2d 332, 342 & n. 
12-14 (D.C. 1998) (en banc) (and cases cited therein).24 To 
the extent each party expected application of its own 
contribution law, it will not upset expectations to now apply 
Ohio law in place of New York law. Since the District of 
Columbia's contribution law is similar to that of Ohio, this 
factor weighs towards displacing New York contribution law 
with Ohio contribution law. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. The recent decision in Washington Hosp. Ctr. explicitly left this 
issue 
unresolved. See 722 A.2d at 342. The case law cited in Washington Hosp. 
Ctr. reveals the District of Columbia uniformly allows such a claim. See 
Taylor v. Tellez, 610 A.2d 252, 254 (D.C. 1992) (settling defendant may 
bring contribution claim against non-settling joint tortfeasor); Early 
Settlers v. Schweid, 221 A.2d 920, 922 (D.C. 1966) (same). The 
purported contrary authority cited by the Washington Hosp. Ctr. court 
involves different types of contribution claims. In Hall v. George A. 
Fuller 
Co., the court held a settling tortfeasor may not obtain contribution from 
another settling tortfeasor because the court could not determine if they 
were jointly liable. See 722 A.2d 332, 342-43 (D.C. 1998). In Rose v. 
Associated Anesthesiologists, the court held a settling tortfeasor may not 
obtain contribution from non-settling tortfeasor who is found solely 
liable. See 501 F.2d 806, 808-10 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In contrast 
Gould/APU seek contribution against a non-settling joint tortfeasor, 
whose joint liability can be determined and who has not been adjudged 
solely liable. 
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        (b) Purposes of Domiciles' Laws 
 
Courts are more likely to displace locus law with 
domiciliary law when the purpose of the domiciliary law is 
superior to and does not interfere with the purpose of the 
locus law. See Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 687; McCann v. 
Somoza, 933 F.Supp. 362, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). In Schultz, 
the plaintiff was domiciled in New Jersey, the defendant 
was domiciled in Ohio, and the tort occurred in New York. 
See Schultz, 65 N.Y.2d at 201. The court displaced the 
charitable immunity law (loss allocating law) of New York 
with the charitable immunity law of New Jersey because 
New Jersey had a strong interest in protecting the 
charitable immunity of its domiciliary and New York had no 
significant interest in applying its charitable immunity law 
to non-domiciliaries. See id. Since New Jersey had a 
superior interest to New York which did not conflict with 
the purpose of the New York law, the court displaced New 
York law with New Jersey law. See id.25 
 
Similarly, in this case, the purpose of Ohio contribution 
law is superior to and does not interfere with the purpose 
of New York contribution law. Ohio contribution law allows 
settling tortfeasors to claim contribution from non-settling 
joint tortfeasors. See Ohio Stat. S 2307.31; Metrohealth, 685 
N.E.2d at 532. The purpose of Ohio's contribution law is "to 
make contribution readily available between joint 
tortfeasors" without exposing any joint tortfeasor to 
potential double liability. Metrohealth, 685 N.E.2d at 532. 
 
The purpose of New York Gen. Oblig. Law S 15-108 is 
"encouraging settlements, fully compensating injured 
victims and equitably allocating liability among tortfeasors." 
Didner v. Keene, 593 N.Y.S.2d 238, 243 (N.Y. App. 1993). 
To achieve this purpose, S 15-108 contains three 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. In contrast, in McCann, the plaintiff was domiciled in New Jersey, the 
defendant was domiciled in New York, and the tort occurred in 
Connecticut. See McCann, 933 F.Supp. at 365. The court refused to 
displace Connecticut law with New Jersey or New York law because the 
three states had conflicting loss allocating law with irreconcilable 
purposes. See id. at 367. The court sought to promote certainty by 
utilizing the locus of the tort as a "tie-breaker" because the laws of the 
domiciles conflicted. See id. 
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subsections which: (a) reduce plaintiff 's recovery against a 
non-settling tortfeasor by the amount obtained in a 
settlement with a joint tortfeasor; (b) bar a non-settling 
joint tortfeasor from obtaining contribution from a settling 
joint tortfeasor; and (c) bar a settling joint tortfeasor from 
obtaining contribution from a non-settling joint tortfeasor. 
See S 15-108(a)-(c); Makeun v. State , 471 N.Y.S.2d 293, 296 
(N.Y. App. 1984). The purpose of subsections (a) and (b) is 
"to encourage settlements by altering or eliminating certain 
rules of prior law which had an inhibiting effect on the 
settlement process." Makeun, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 296 (quoting 
Rock v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package of Mach. Co. , 346 
N.E.2d 520, 523 (N.Y. 1976)); N.Y. State Legis. Annual, 15 
(1974). On the other hand, the purpose of subsection (c) is 
two-fold. First, it acts as a "quid pro quo" preventing a 
settling tortfeasor from obtaining contribution when he is 
insulated from contribution. See id. (citing McDermott v. 
City of New York, 406 N.E.2d 460, 464 (N.Y. 1980); Rock, 
346 N.E.2d at 524). Second, to the extent a settling 
tortfeasor pays more than his share, this section"may be 
justified on the ground that he is a volunteer as to the 
excess paid by him." Id. (quoting Codling v. Paglia, 327 
N.Y.S.2d 978, 986 (N.Y. App. 1978)). 
 
At the same time, New York has "no interest in applying 
its [contribution] laws for the benefit of nonresidents and to 
the detriment of its residents." Brewster v. Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad Co., 585 N.Y.S.2d 647, 648 (N.Y. App. 1992). In 
Brewster, the court refused to give contribution claim 
defendants the benefit of New York contribution law when 
they were both domiciled in other states. See id. at 648-49. 
On the present facts, New York has no interest in extending 
the protection of its contribution law to the United States, 
assuming it is domiciled in the District of Columbia or 
nowhere. By the same token, New York has no interest in 
inhibiting the contribution rights of Gould/APU, 
domiciliaries of Ohio. Finally, the Allen plaintiffs, the only 
New York domiciliaries related to this case, have been 
compensated by virtue of the underlying tort settlement 
and are not parties to this contribution claim. 
 
New York's interest in achieving settlement of the Allen 
claims has been satisfied. See Lang Tendons, Inc. v. Great 
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Southwest Marketing, Inc., 1994 WL 159014, at *4 (E.D.Pa. 
1994).26 While subsections (a) and (b) achieve the purpose 
of encouraging settlement, subsection (c) does not. See 
Makeun, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 296. In fact, commentators have 
argued subsection (c) acts as "a barrier to settlements, 
rather than an aid." Id. at 297 (citing Green, General 
Obligations Law, Section 15-108: An Unsettling Law , New 
York State Bar Journal, 28 (Oct. 1983)). Accordingly, any 
interest New York has in promoting settlement will not be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. The decision in Lang Tendons is illuminating. In Lang Tendons, the 
plaintiff, a Pennsylvania domiciliary, settled a tort claim in New York 
federal court arising from a tort that occurred in Korea. The plaintiff 
then brought a contribution claim against the defendant, a Texas 
domiciliary. The defendant was a non-party to the prior litigation 
because the New York federal court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. 
The defendant sought application of the New York contribution law, 
specifically the S 15-108(c) bar against contribution claims against non- 
settling joint tortfeasors. The plaintiff sought application of 
Pennsylvania 
contribution law. See id. at *3. 
 
The court conducted a choice of law analysis, applying Pennsylvania's 
interest analysis, and concluded Pennsylvania had the greater interest in 
the outcome of the litigation because: (i) Pennsylvania had a strong 
interest in vindicating the interests of its domiciliary; (ii) New York's 
interest had been satisfied by the settlement and had no interest in third 
party contribution claims outside of New York; (iii) the locus of the tort 
was not in New York; and (iv) there was a strong interest in not having 
the defendant avoid all liability simply because it could not have been 
joined as a co-defendant in the underlying tort suit. 
 
In the present case, Ohio, the domicile of Gould/APU, has the stronger 
interest in the outcome of this litigation. First, Ohio has a strong 
interest 
in protecting the rights of its domiciliaries to receive contribution from 
joint tortfeasors. See Metrohealth, 685 N.E.2d at 532. Second, New 
York's interest in encouraging settlement has been vindicated and New 
York therefore no longer has an interest in whether contribution claims 
are pursued in other jurisdictions. See Makeun , 471 N.Y.S.2d at 297. 
Finally, the United States could not have been joined as a defendant in 
New York state court because of sovereign immunity. Applying New York 
contribution law would allow the United States to escape all liability 
because the Allen plaintiffs sued in New York state court, where the 
United States is shielded from liability. 
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advanced by application of S 15-108(c) to bar Gould/APU's 
contribution claim against the United States.27 
 
In contrast, Ohio has a strong interest in applying its 
contribution law to protect its domiciliary's rights to obtain 
contribution. Cf. Sullivan v. J.V. McNichols Transfer Co., 
638 N.Y.S.2d 260, 262 (N.Y. App. 1996) (New York has no 
interest in applying New York loss allocation law to Ohio 
domiciliary). Because Ohio's interest in protecting the 
contribution rights of Gould/APU is superior to and does 
not interfere with the purpose of New York's contribution 
law, this factor weighs in favor of displacing New York law 
with Ohio law. 
 
        (c) Locus State Not Domicile of Any Party  
 
Third, courts are more likely to displace the locus law 
when the locus state is not one of the plaintiff 's or 
defendant's domiciles. Compare Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 682- 
83 (locus law displaced when locus not a domicile of any 
party); Sheldon v. PHH Corp., 135 F.3d 848, 853 (2d Cir. 
1998) (same) with LaForge v. Normandin, 551 N.Y.S.2d 142, 
142 (N.Y.App. 1990) (locus law not displaced when locus is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
27. The United States correctly indicates thatS 15-108(c) has been 
applied to bar contribution claims by a settling tortfeasor against New 
York state, even if New York had immunity in the underlying suit and 
could not be impleaded as a third party defendant. See Makeun, 471 
N.Y.S.2d at 298; Maryland Cas. Co. v. State, 411 N.Y.S.2d 706, 707 (N.Y. 
App. 1978). However, neither Makeun nor Maryland Cas. Co. precludes 
displacement of New York contribution law with Ohio contribution law. 
Both cases involved contribution claims by New York domiciliaries 
against New York State. See id. In both cases, the New York domiciliary 
plaintiffs argued the S 15-108(c) bar against contribution did not apply 
because New York State could not have been joined as a defendant in 
the underlying action. See id. The New York court held S 15-108(c) does 
not contain an exception for contribution claims against parties over 
whom the court lacked jurisdiction in the underlying action. See id. In 
contrast, this case involves a contribution claim by two non-New York 
domiciliaries (Gould/APU) against a defendant (United States) which 
could not have been joined in the underlying Allen lawsuit. The issue is 
not whether S 15-108(c) provides an exception for a defendant who could 
not be joined, but whether application of Gould/APU's Ohio contribution 
law will be superior to and will not interfere with application of the 
locus 
contribution law of New York. 
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one party's domicile); Hamilton, 47 F.Supp.2d at 337 
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (same). If the United States is domiciled in 
the District of Columbia or nowhere and Gould/APU are 
domiciled in Ohio, neither party is domiciled in the locus of 
New York. This factor favors displacement of New York law 
with Ohio law. 
 
        (d) Fortuity of Contacts with Locus State  
 
Fourth, courts are more likely to displace locus law with 
domiciliary law when the parties have minimal contact with 
the locus jurisdiction and the tort occurring there was due 
to fortuity, happenstance, or randomness. Compare 
Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1, 13 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (Scottish law displaced by plaintiff 's domiciliary 
law because plane crashing in Scotland was random); 
Sheldon, 135 F.3d at 853 (Michigan law displaced by 
domiciliary law because car accident occurring in Michigan 
was fortuity); Stevens v. Shields, 499 N.Y.S.2d 351, 352 
(N.Y. App. 1986) with Simons v. Marriott Corp., 1993 WL 
410457, *7 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Texas law not displaced by 
domiciliary law because defendant voluntarily built hotel in 
Texas); Hamilton, 47 F.Supp.2d at 341 (California law not 
displaced by domiciliary law because plaintiff voluntarily 
came to California on business trip). There was nothing 
random or fortuitous about Gould/APU and the United 
States voluntarily building and operating a battery 
manufacturing plant in the locus state of New York. 
Therefore, the fortuity factor counsels against displacement 
of New York law with Ohio law. 
 
        (e) Forum Shopping 
 
Fifth, courts are hesitant to displace locus law with 
domiciliary law if it encourages forum shopping. See, e.g., 
Aboud, 29 F.Supp.2d at 182. This concern is not present in 
this case because the FTCA does not allow forum shopping. 
Rather, under the FTCA, the court must apply the"whole 
law" of the state where the act or omission occurred, 
regardless of where the suit is filed. See Richards, 369 U.S. 
at 11. Because there can be no forum shopping for 
substantive law under the FTCA, this factor weighs in favor 
of displacement of New York law with Ohio law. 
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        (f) Favoring Local Litigants 
 
Sixth, courts are hesitant to displace locus law with 
domiciliary law if it causes the appearance of favoring local 
litigants. See, e.g., Aboud, 29 F.Supp.2d at 182. This 
concern is not present here because Gould and APU are 
Ohio domiciliaries and not local litigants in Pennsylvania 
federal court. Accordingly, this factor does not counsel 
against displacement of New York law with Ohio law. 
 
In sum, five of the six factors favor displacement of New 
York law with Ohio law: the domiciles of Gould, APU, and 
the United States have similar, or at least non-conflicting, 
contribution law; Ohio's strong interest in protecting its 
domiciliaries' rights to contribution is superior to and does 
not interfere with New York's interest in achieving 
settlement, which has already been satisfied; the locus of 
the tort is not in the domicile of any party; and displacing 
New York law will not encourage forum shopping or give the 
appearance of favoring local litigants. Weighed against 
these five considerations is the fortuity factor, which, 
standing alone, is simply not enough to prevent 
displacement of New York locus law with Ohio domiciliary 
law. This result will advance the interests of Ohio without 
upsetting the smooth working of a multi-state system or 
causing uncertainty for litigants. It follows, if the United 
States is domiciled in the District of Columbia or nowhere, 
the exception to the third Neumeier rule applies and Ohio 
contribution law governs the FTCA jurisdictional inquiry. 
 
* * * 
 
In conclusion, regardless of whether the United States is 
domiciled in all 50 states, the District of Columbia or 
nowhere, New York choice of law rules dictate that Ohio 
contribution law governs the FTCA jurisdictional inquiry. 
Ohio contribution law allows settling tortfeasors to claim 
contribution from non-settling joint tortfeasors, so long as 
the settlement extinguishes liability of the non-settling 
party to the underlying plaintiff. See Ohio Stat. S 2307.31; 
Metrohealth, 685 N.E.2d at 532. In the Release presented to 
the District Court the Allen plaintiffs released "all other 
persons including but not limited to the federal 
government, the U.S. Army and/or other federal agencies or 
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entities from any and all . . . claims asserted or which 
could have been asserted, in the action captioned Cheryl 
Allen, et al. v. Marathon Battery Co., et al., .. . ." App. 705a. 
Under Ohio law, the United States will be liable to 
Gould/APU for contribution if the facts at trial call for that 
result. Accordingly, the District Court's ruling it lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over the contribution claim must 
be reversed. 
 
C. Indemnification Under New York, Pennsylvania, 
       Ohio, and District of Columbia Law 
 
Indemnification occurs when one person is held solely 
liable for the acts of another person. See Rogers v. 
Dorchester Assocs., 300 N.E.2d 403, 410 (N.Y. 1973); 
Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 77 A.2d 368, 371 (Pa. 
1951); Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Huron Road Hospital, 653 
N.E.2d 235, 238 (Ohio 1995); Quadrangle Development 
Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 748 A.2d 432, 435 (D.C. 2000).28 
One may obtain indemnification only if he is not 
responsible in any degree for the harm caused. See Rosado, 
484 N.E.2d at 1356-57 (N.Y.); Builders Supply Co., 77 A.2d 
at 371 (Pa.); Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.E.2d at 238 
(Ohio); Quadrangle Development Corp., 748 A.2d at 435 
(D.C.). If the party seeking indemnification is partially at 
fault, it cannot receive indemnification from another. See 
id. 
 
The District Judge correctly decided Gould/APU would 
not be entitled to indemnity from the United States because 
they were at least partially at fault for the injuries to the 
Allen plaintiffs. According to the Complaint, Gould's 
predecessors operated the plant and discharged hazardous 
waste under government contract from 1953 to 1962. From 
1962 to 1969, Gould and its predecessors owned and 
operated the plant and continued to discharge hazardous 
waste. From 1969 to 1979, APU and its predecessors owned 
and operated the plant and continued to discharge 
hazardous waste. The Complaint alleges Gould/APU were 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
28. As discussed, supra, there is a false conflict between New York, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and District of Columbia indemnification law, 
making it unnecessary to perform a conflict of laws analysis for the 
indemnification claim. 
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at least partially negligent and at fault for the Allen 
plaintiffs' injuries. Accordingly, Gould/APU may not seek 
indemnification from the United States. 
 
Gould/APU argue, under New York law, the doctrine of 
"partial indemnification" permits indemnification between 
joint tortfeasors where one was primarily responsible for 
the injuries. See Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 282 N.E.2d 288, 
291 (N.Y. 1972). However, Gould/APU concede Dole  has 
been superseded and clarified by N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law S 15- 
108, which allows a party who is partially at fault to seek 
contribution, but not indemnification. See In re Brooklyn 
Navy Yard Asbestos Litigation, 971 F.2d 831, 842 (2d Cir. 
1992). Moreover, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio, and the District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals have squarely rejected similar partial 
indemnification theories, instead allowing contribution from 
a primarily, but not solely, liable joint tortfeasor. See 
Builders Supply Co., 77 A.2d at 371 (Pa. 1951); Motorists 
Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.E.2d at 238; District of Columbia v. 
Washington Hosp. Center, 722 A.2d 332, 340-41 (D.C. 
1998). It follows, there is no doctrine of partial 
indemnification that would permit Gould/APU to pursue an 
indemnity claim against the United States. 
 
Finally, Gould/APU assert that they are entitled to 
indemnity for the Allen claim for abnormally dangerous 
activity, a strict liability tort for which there is no fault. See 
Doundalakis v. Town of Hempstead, 368 N.E.2d 24, 28 
(N.Y. 1977) (strict liability for abnormally dangerous 
activity); Diffenderfer v. Staner, 722 A.2d 1103, 1106 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1999) (same); Brown v. County Commissioners, 
622 N.E.2d 1153, 1159 (Ohio. App. 1993) (same); Beard v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 587 A.2d 195, 201 (D.C. 1991) 
(same). However, if two parties are jointly liable for a strict 
liability tort, the appropriate remedy is contribution, not 
indemnification, between the parties. See Doundalakis, 368 
N.E.2d at 29 (N.Y.); Baker v. AC&S, Inc., 729 A.2d 1140, 
1149 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (citing Walton v. Avco Corp., 610 
A.2d 454, 462 (Pa. 1992)); Hamilton v. RB&W Corp., 1998 
WL 32777, at *2-*3 (Ohio. App. 1998) (citing Bowling v. Heil 
Co., 511 N.E.2d 373, 380-81 (Ohio 1987)); Washington 
Hosp. Center, 722 A.2d at 340-41 (D.C.). If Gould/APU 
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could prove the United States was jointly liable, the 
appropriate remedy would be contribution, not 
indemnification. 
 
Under New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, or District of 
Columbia law, the United States would not be liable to 
Gould/APU for indemnification. Accordingly, the District 
Court's ruling it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 
indemnity claim will be affirmed. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the District Court 
has jurisdiction over the contribution claim but lacks 
jurisdiction over the indemnification claim. The District 
Court's ruling is AFFIRMED as to indemnification and 
REVERSED as to contribution and REMANDED for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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